The essay is focused on the idea that the content considered to be intrinsic to the principle of presumption of guilt is the product of specific ideological choices, ranging between a higher sensitivity to social defence and individual guarantees. This is confirmed by the historical social debate in Italy, by the classical school up to the Republican Constitution, by the ideas of the positivist school and those of the technical-juridical school. Then the work opens to a comparative perspective, by analyzing certain aspects of the presumption of guilt in some European state systems, both from a constitutional point of view and from the point of view of the disciplines specifically pertaining to the different juridical cultures; they leave us doubts about the legitimacy of normative and interpretation models, which seem to consider some elements of the cases in point as being implicit in the tangible fact or to be assessed by presumptions, with a possible inversion of the burden of proof. After an excursus about the homogenizing role of the presumption of guilt within a supranational perspective, the research focuses on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and of the European Court of Justice, highlighting some of its ambiguities and contradictions as regards the admission of "reasonable" waivers of the presumption of guilt as rule of evidence. The same critical observations are made as regards the proposal of EU directive about the consolidation of the idea of the presumption of guilt, which, instead, paradoxically seems to weaken its content of defence of civil rights. The research deals with some hypotheses undermining the principle by the help of the substantive penal law, such as the ideas of presumed danger or intention and guilt, underlining, on the contrary, the necessity of an integrated vision of the penal system, imposing a model of trial being consistent with that of the substantive law defending civil rights. Conclusions are devoted to the risk, due to misunderstood punishment efficiency, of a substantially new interpretation, from a probative point of view, of substantive penal guarantees showing how the case law and European norms in course of development can influence this. Finally they also deal with the critical points and ambiguities in the evaluation of the 
a judgement rule, 10 as expression of the in dubio pro reo-at the same time rule about the burden of proof-a fundamental instrument against illiberal abuses.
11
The sensitivity of this doctrine towards the guarantist value of guilt presumption, was such as to directly affect also the typical themes of substantive law, which were linked to the undermining of the principle in the case of types of offenses built on the presumption of elements against the defendant, only causing, in this way, the inversion of the burden of proof. nocent or guilty. 23 It is then evident that the value of the presumption of innocence changes according to the ideology ruling within a certain historical context. 24 In the second postwar period this led the Constituent to take a clearer stand, in Italy, in favour of the presumption of innocence, which has been instead watered down in the weaker compromissory formula-that of non guilt up to the final conviction, referred to by art. 27, par. 2, Const. This has given place to different interpretations, some of them fundamentally consistent with the previous positions of the technical-juridical school, according to which the defendant finds himself in a "neutral" position, not of presumption of guilt, of mere non guilt.
25
The above brief excursus shows that the guarantist value of the principle has a double effect: both as a rule for dealing with the defendant, which excludes or reduces the possibility of his personal freedom; and as judgement rule, which imposes the burden of proof by the prosecution and the acquittal in case of doubt. In the latter sense, the presumption of guilt may have important consequences also on the substantive penal law, as Carrara had already guessed as regards those incriminating rules built up in order to presume elements of the type of offense for which the defedant is indicted, without any necessity for the prosecution to prove their existence. 
The Rule of Evidence for the Presumption of Innocence in Some European Legal Systems
The two "cores" of the presumption of innocence seem to have a different historical-cultural origin: as rule for dealing with the defendant, within the legalitarian principle of the continental illuminists; as judgement or evidence rule, within the pragmatism of the Anglo-Saxon judiciary gnoseology. 27 Even if the ranges of action are well distinguished, from a rational point of view the link between the two stages seems quite clear, since that such presumption implies, from one side, that punishment must follow the conviction sentence and, on the other side, that the liability must be proved by prosecution in the ways provided by law. 
Great Britain
In common law systems the principle is historically linked to the evidential field 23 Mortara, 1915: p. 153; Leone (1937), p. 357; Sabatini (1931) , p. 33. Within this context in Italy the repudiation of the principle by the fascist legislator in the 1930 was expected. He considered the presumption of innocence "absurd" and a product of the "old" illuministic ideals; see Rocco, 1929: p. 22; Sermonti (1943) Manzini (1952) , p. 202 et seq.; Leone (1961), p. 207; Siracusano, 1961: p. 733; Lozzi (1968) , p. 10; Ghiara, 1974: p. 73 et seq. The ambiguity of the constitutional formula, after all, has also legitimated many attempts of restoration of the principle-which can be shared in the light of a spirit of deep change that has inspired the Italian Constituent-, aiming at a more guarantist application of it, by the removal of the distinction between the presumption of guilt and the presumption of innocence; see Malinverni (1972), p. 472; Bellavista, 1976: p. 84; Illuminati (1979), p. 28; Dominioni (1985) , p. 239; Paulesu (2009) Roberts & Zuckerman (2004) , p. 327; Illuminati (1979) , p. 28 et seq. 28 For a rapid comparative review at an European level Lazerges, 2004: p. 125 et seq. and the famous formula of the presumption of innocence, up to a contrary proof beyond any reasonable doubt. 29 In Great Britain, the famous decision of the
House of Lords, Woolmington vs. Director of Public Prosecutions dating back to
1935, has established the rule according to which the prosecutor is bound to demonstrate the guilt of the defendant, failing which he cannot be convicted.
30
Although the above said decision deals with this issue only in an incidental way, the principle is undisputed and by now belongs to that juridical culture, 31 so much so that such decision has also influenced the American jurusprudence, being the model for the other famous sentence of the Supreme Court of the United States, In re Winship dating back to 1970, according to which, in order to consider the defendant guilty, each "essential element" of the offense must be proved, beyond any reasonable doubt.
32
In Anglo-Saxon legal systems, then, the presumption of innocence is above all linked to the burden of proof (legal burden) falling upon the prosecution, in the sense that the jury must be convinced, without any reasonable doubt left. 33 The legal burden, therefore, identifies the party upon which the burden of persuading the jury falls, while the evidential burden usually falls upon the party bound to raise a question for the acquittal of the defendant or to demonstrate his innocence prima facie, a burden that in some cases can be ascribed to the defendant, while the legal burden always falls only upon the prosecutor.
34
Since it is known that in the English legal system there is no written Constitution, the presumption of innocence has not got this "coverage" rank of principle of primary importance. Notwithstanding this, the approval in 1998 of the Human Rights Act, being in force since 2000, has caused a "selective" inclusion within the English legal system, of the European Convention for the protection of human rights. 35 One of the possible implications is the influence on the English penal law of art. 6, par. 2, ECHR, as regards the presumption of innocence, above all in some fields where more evident conflicts emerge.
36
A possible conflict with the principle under discussion regards the burden of proof that in Great Britain can concern some elements of certain offenses. 37 According to the ECHR principle included into the English system and the power of adaptation to the same ECHR, recognized by art. 3 of the Human Rights Act, 29 For a review of the presumption of innocence in England and more in general in the systems of common law, Stuckenberg (1997) , p. 253 et seq. In such systems the application of the principle also in relation with the treatment of the defendant, cannot be excluded. Such treatment is perhaps less important in consideration of the importance that in those systems the Habeas Corpus has got to prevent abuses against personal freedom; on the subject Roberts & Zuckerman (2004) Keane (2006), p. 474. 34 On the distribution of the evidential burden as "technique of risk allocation" we refer to Zuckerman (1989) , p. 105 et seq. On the distinction between "legal burden" and "evidential burden", Munday (2015) , p. 65 et seq. Sullivan, 2005: p. 195 et seq. 37 Stumer (2010), passim; Tadros & Tierney, 2004: p. 402 et seq. the House of Lords in some cases has upturned, in a sense favourable to the defendant, the provision of a burden of proof falling upon him by law.
38
In this specific case, the claimant had been convicted for the possession of drugs for the purpose of pushing, since that the police had found him holding a big bag containing two kilos of cocaine, in infringement of the section 5.3 of the Misuse of Drugs Act dating back to 1971. The section 28 of the same law, on the other hand, provided the burden for the defendant, to prove that he did not think, he did not suspect, nor had any reason to doubt that they were drugs forbidden by law. In the first degree of judgement the defendant had defended himself by affirming that he did not know nor had any reason to think that in the big bag there were drugs. But the Judge had given directions to the jury about the fact that the prosecution had to prove the only possession of the big bag and, in this case, of the cocaine, thus leaving to the defendant the burden to prove that he did not know what the big bag really contained. The House of Lords has considered that this burden of proof violates the presumption of innocence guaranteed by art. 6.2 of the ECHR, and has adopted an adaptive interpretation of section 28 of the Misuse of Drugs Act, in the sense that such rule imposes a mere "evidential" and not a real burden of proof falling upon the defendant. For him it is enough to sustain not to have been aware of the drug quality of the substances that he possessed, thus giving place to the burden by the prosecution to prove otherwise.
39
The approach of the English courts has been, on the contrary, more cautious and conservative as regards the different hypotheses of strict liability, that is of objective liability, which, failing a system of administrative offenses, the Anglo-Saxon law continues to punish, without being necessary that the prosecution proves the intention or the knowledge or the recklessness or the negligence of them. 40 The English judges have denied that in these cases there is a violation of 42 The possibility of designing tyes of offense with some elements, in some way presumed, which must not be proved by the prosecution, is admitted, since the presumption of innocence would not also imply a special substantial content of the penal law, that is the necessary description of some objective and subjective elements of the incriminated fact.
Germany
In some systems of civil law the presumption of innocence does not always receive an explicit internal normative recognition, nevertheless this has not avoided, anyway, the principle to be unconditionally included also within these legal systems. 43 In Germany, 44 for example, the presumption of innocence (die Unschuldsvermutung) is implicitly deduced from the principles of the Constitutional State that are "republikanischen, demokratischen und sozialen" according to art. 28 of the Grundgesetz. 45 The German procedure, as regards the proof, is ruled by the principle of the investigation,which allows the judge to become convinced, within certain limits of rationality, without being bound by the declarations received. 46 The judge, on the other hand, in order to convict the defendant, is thought, according to the principle of the free evaluation of the proof (der Grundsatz der freien Beweiswürdigung, § 261 Strafprozeßordnung -StPO), to be convinced without any doubt, since the latter is in favour of the defendant. 47 The German penal trial is not of "parties" and if, from one side, the prosecution is charged with extending its investigations to the elements being favourable to the defendant ( § 160, II, StPO) as it also happens in other legal systems, where the trial is considered "of parties"; on the other side the judge himself has to extend his research to any element of proof being relevant for his decision ( § 244, II, StPO). 48 The burden of proof (die Beweislast), then, does not only fall upon the prosecution, since the principle of the search of the "tangible truth" by the judge is implicitly acknowledged.
49
One of the issues in Germany that seems to cause some problems linked to the presumption of innocence, 50 is that concerning the criminal offenses of abstract or presumed danger, described as "typically" dangerous, without the proof of In such countries, like Germany and Belgium, the principle of the presumption of innocence and the related corollaries, like that of the in dubio pro reo, are directly derived from the international sources, like art. 6, par. 2, of the ECHR. See Degenhart (2014) , p. 176 et seq. For an analysis of the principle of the presumption of innocence in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, with special reference to the German system, see Barrot, 2010: p. 701 et seq. 44 For a wide analysis of the presumption of innocence in Germany, Stuckenberg (1997) Krauβ, 1971: p. 153 et seq.; Frister (1988), p. 85; Roxin (1992) Krey (2007) , p. 157 et seq.; Clages (2004), p. 46; Juy-Burmann, 2001: p. 193; Rieβ (2001) In the legislation of this country, types of offense exist that, even if they invert the burden of proof falling upon the defendant, they are not considered to be in contrast with the principle of the presumption of innocence. 63 In Belgium, then,
51
About danger offenses in the literature in German language see Wohlers (2000) ; Zieschang (1998); Kindhäuser (1989); Horn (1973) .
52
For a comment on these offenses Steindorf (1997) Schünemann, 1975 : p. 787 et seq. As regards other attempts to solve the conflict with the presumption of guilt, see Horn (1973) , p. 94 et seq. The German doctrine has also created a category of danger half way between concrete and abstract (abstrakt-konkrete Gefährdungsdelikte o potentielle Gefährdungsdelikte); on the subject we refer to Schröder, 1969; p 8 et seq.; Rudolphi, 1984: p. 248 et seq.; Azzali, 2006 Azzali, : pp. 1340 Azzali, -1341 Bohnert, 1984: p. 182 et seq. 59 In general Dejemeppe, 2007: p. 17 et seq. In particular about the forms of presumption of penal liability, see Colette-Basecqz, 2008: p. 413 et seq. 60 du Jardin & Masset, 1993: p. 959; Pesquié, 2001: p. 46; Kuty, 2003: p. 524 The presumption of innocence in France has been strongly associated with its function of evidential rule,from which also the rule affirmanti incumbit probatio and the identification of the party on which the risk of the failed proof or of doubt falls back, that is the public prosecutor or the plaintiff (partie poursuivante).
73 It is the prosecuting party, which provides for the proof of the criminal offence made, in order to "établir tous les éléments constitutifs de l'infraction et l'absence de tous les éléments susceptibles de la fa ire disparaître". For a review of the presumption of innocence in France, Stuckenberg (1997) , p. 171 et seq. As regards comparative profiles Koering-Joulin, Buchet & Coste (1998) , passim, in particular Buchet (1998), p. 27 et seq.; Brigham (1998) of the role of the French penal judge and of the traditional principle of the intime conviction. 75 As regards the first aspect, the reference is to the judge's examining power of the tangible truth; 76 as regards the second aspect, the reference is, instead, to the circumstance for which the law does not require the judge to explicit, what supports his conviction, nor it fixes any rule from which to derive the adequacy of a proof, but it only requires the judge to ask himself about which impression the proofs collected have left in the depth of his conscience. 77 These two aspects, can practically shift the balance of the burden of proof, not only for the unofficial examining power of the judge, but also because the defendant, in consideration of the unforeseeable character of the intime conviction, will be spurred to a defence of himself not merely passive (that is waiting for the prosecution to fulfil its task), but more active, that is aiming at introducing new evidence for the defence.
78
In France the prosecution has to provide both the proof of the matérialité de l'infraction, and that of the culpabilité du suspect. 79 In the first sense, the proof concerns the tort (acte répréhensible, both action and omission) and its accessories, such as circumstances, and obviously the identity of the author of the tort.
Also in this system, inculpatory rules exist waiving the principle of the presumption of innocence and of the burden of proof falling upon the prosecution. 
92
According to the Tribunal Constitucional de España, the presumption of innocence, as evidential rule, implies that the burden of proof falls solely upon the prosecution, without a probatio diabolica of the negative facts being requirable by the defence. 93 The proof falling upon the prosecution, again according to the Spanish Constitutional Court, is that aiming at proving the fact subject of incrimination and the circumstances characterizing it, the causal relationship, as well 84 See Conseil constitutionnel, decision nr. 99-411 DC, June 16 th 1999, in <www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr>. The Court has admitted "reasonable" waivers of the presumption of innocence, considering it liable to be "balanced" with the protection of the public order. On the subject see Mayaud, 1999 : p. 589 et seq. Another type of offence in the French legal system, art. 392, par. 1, Code des douanes, has been submitted to the examination of the ECtHR for infringement of the principle of the presumption of innocence, being the subject of the above mentioned decision Salabiaku vs. France, dated October 7 th 1988, which will be later better discussed (fn. 123).
85
For some examples of "faute présumée" under the previous French Penal Code in force, see Stéfani & Levasseur (1962) , § § 298-300.
86 Urbino-Soullier, 1987: p. 750; De Guardia, 1990: p. 487 We must then remember that the Spanish jurisprudence makes a distinction between presumed and abstract danger. 101 The first hypothesis occurs when a conduct objectively corresponding to the type of offense is considered criminal as such, without the possibility of a different assessment or of a contrary evidence. This category is considered to be in conflict with the principle of the presumption of innocence. The abstract danger, instead, takes place when the legislator designs a type of offense before it is committed, where the entity being the holder of the legal asset put in danger is not pre-determined. In order to integrate this type of offense, it is however necessary that such danger, as risk of a future offense to that legal asset, is really existing in the concrete conduct, in order that "ésta incluya en sí el contenido de antijuridicidad penal y la adecuación al tipo necesario para su ilicitud penal".
102 Such approach falls within a doctrinal context in which "the typical characteristic of a type of offense without offense is a characteristic empty of its typical value, and being, therefore, without penal relevance. In this context the Tribunal Constitucional has clearly linked the harm principle to that of the principle of legality, in order to mean that the typical character must be always the expression of a harm or of danger for legal assets. The distinction made by the Spanish jurisprudence between abstract and concrete danger, in some ways reminds to that made in the Italian doctrine, by Parodi Giusino (1990), p. 217 et seq. See also the distinction between offenses of danger only seemingly abstract and offenses of danger really abstract or presumed, made by Marinucci & E. Dolcini (2001) to the law of the Union, since they are general principles, among which there is also the presumption of innocence.
The Role of the Presumption of Innocence in the Supranational Cohesion of Legal Systems

113
In these provisions the presumption of innocence is described in "positive to identify the differences of interpretation and application of the presumption of non guilt in the member States, in order to suggest minimum shared rules avoiding differences between the levels of guarantees offered by the different
States. 117 For this purpose the "Green Paper" has also dealt with the circumstances for which, in case they occur in different countries, the inversion of the burden of proof or its modification, is admitted.
108
For an analysis of the principle of the presumption of innocence in the rules concerning special penal international Courts, see Klamberg (2013) Paulesu, 2008: p. 127. 115 Cfr. Illuminati (1979) , p. 26 et seq.
116
The final "Green Paper", Bruxelles, April 26 th , COM (2006 174 can be found in <eur-lex.europa.eu>; Bassiouni (2008), p. 264; Ruggieri, 2008: pp. 514-515. 117 Canestrari & Foffani, 2005 , in particular the contributions of Picotti, Bernardi, Silva Sánchez, Tiedemann, Lüederssen, Vervaele, p. 325 et seq.; Bernardi, 2007: p. 193 et seq.
Then we can say that the principle of the presumption of innocence-because of its solid ideological core shared by the old continent influenced by the illuminist thought-, aims at playing a leading role in the harmonization of the European systems, as the natural guarantee of whom undergoes penal proceedings.
This allows to create a cohesion at a sopranational level, both for the common law, and for the civil law systems following a prosecution procedure as well as an investigation procedure. 123 Once the proof of the tangible fact has been received, for these types of offense a kind of legal presumption of existence of the subjective element would exist. The European Court on its side, has specified that such presumption must be considered as applicable into reasonable limits, always taking into accout the degree of seriousness of the offense and the rights of the defence to be respected. 124 In this way a mere balance in terms of proportion is made, in order to find out if the sacrifice of the guilt principles and of the presumption of innocence is reasonable compared with the purposes of criminal policy. 125 The Court has then given legitimacy limits to these types of objective liability, without identifying them clearly, thus affirming at the same time, the non opportunity of limiting the range of art. 6, par. 2, ECHR, to a mere formal and unconditioned reference to any assumption of typical character of the offense freely established by the laws of the member States. According to this jurisprudence, then, the principle of innocence is not foreign to the presumptions in fact or in law that can be found in penal laws-with all the consequent implications of substantive law-, but it imposes to the member States to keep them within reasonable limits.
126
Although the sentence "Salabiaku" is not easy to read and in some ways it seems ambiguous, it leaves space to implications of substantive law being typical of the presumption of innocence, with reference to the principle of guilt and to the limits fixed by the legislator on designing the incriminatory types of offense. 127 It seems possible to affirm that the Court does not exclude the necessity of the existence of a mens rea among the elements of the offense, but it shifts its attention above all as regards the probative aspect, considering it legitimate, within reasonable limits, that the legislator allows the implicit assessment of evidence by presumptions derived from the tangibility of the conduct. The ambiguity of the decision and the shift of reasoning, as regards the assessment of evidence, are in some way typical of the role of guarantee of the ECtHR, which is more focused on the defence of the legal system and the principles of the member State, on the effectiveness of the protection of the rights acknowledged by the ECHR in concrete situations. This gives place to a jurisprudence based on cases which cannot be understood if it is separated from the practical case under examination.
128
In the sentence "Salabiaku", in theory, affirmations that leave a margin of uncertainty are made, since it is stated, on one side, that the States can, under certain conditions, establish to punish a tangible fact, as such, deriving from a malicious or involuntary intent; on the other side, it is clearly stated that the presunption of innocence also involves substantive penal law, because otherwise "the national legislature would be free to strip the trial court of any genuine power of assessment and deprive the presumption of innocence of its substance, if the words "according to law" were construed exclusively with reference to domestic law", a result considered to be incompatibile with the purpose of art. 6, par. 2, ECHR.
129
The contingent case submitted to the ECtHR, then, has been solved by a judgement referring to the "denounced" rule (art. 392 code des douanes), not in an abstract way, but practically, that is referred to its practical application, getting to the conclusion that there was no infringement of art. 6, par. 2, ECHR, because the French judges, even if the incriminatory rule made it possible, had not limited their action to an automatic presumption, as it was the case, but had also assessed a psychological element (élément intentionnel) in the concrete case. Although it is not clear whether such need of assessing the psychological element is limited to the procedural aspect (as restoration of the burden of proof falling upon the prosecution), or it can be extended to the "substantive" aspect (as a necessity of the subjective element of the penal liability), we can sustain that, even if we wanted to limit such need to the sense of the trial, a clear effect of it at the level of substantive law exists. This is only because, if a psychological element-even if it is not explicitly described in the type of offense-must be however assessed in conformity with the presumption of innocence, such an element implicitly helps describing the substantive case conforming, then, with the principle referred to by art. 6, par. 2, ECHR.
130 This shows the fundamental role played by the presumption of innocence in the relationships between the substantive penal law and the procedural law, in order to avoid the exploitation of the former for a blind claim of effectiveness of the latter.
131
The question comes out again in another way, if we admit that in the assessment of the objective element we can solely rely on presumptions that can be de- 
133
Besides the types of the so called objective liability, another problematic area of interest, which is in some way related to this, is that of the inversion of the burden of proof, which, under certain conditions, would be legitimated by the same argumentations of the above mentioned sentence "Salabiaku". tional cases, above all in the case of less serious offenses, the prosecution is required to prove that the defendant has had a certain conduct, while the defendant must prove a certain situation suitable for eliminating his liability. Such hypotheses are more controversial when the defendant is required to prove the absence of an element of the case (a subjective or objective element), which otherwise is assumed to exist, a burden that in theory would fall upon the prosecution.
135
Similar positions have been assumed by the jurispridence of the European Court of Justice too, which, besides underlining that the presumption of innocence has a wider range that has not to be limited only to a procedural guarantee, 136 has also affirmed that the principle, as judgement rule, can be also applied to the infringement of the rules on the competition of enterprises, which can
give place to the imposition of amends and penalties. 137 The influences of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR are clear, since that, as regards the burden of proof, it is stated that presumptions can be admitted, provided that they are kept within reasonable limits. 138 According to the European Court of Justice, for example, the presumption which does not overcome such limits is that in which the intention of the author of abuse of privileged information, is implicitly deduced by the tangible elements characterizing such infringement: this presumption is refutable and the rights of the defence are guaranteed.
139
Just the inversion of the burden of proof, according to presumptions, has been recently dealt with by the European Commission in the directive proposal which is discussed in the following paragraph, with results that are, we anticipate it, disappointing.
The Weakening of the Principle in the EU Directive Proposal on the Presumption of Innocence
The proximate and risky to transform a very specific and case based jurisprudence into a rule that generalizes and legitimates legislative presumptions having the power of inverting the burden of proof, a rule that therefore does not suitably reflect the particular aspects of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.
Moreover art. 5, par. 2 appears to be quite questionable and equivocal in the part in which it tries to impose a limit to admissible presumptions, limiting them solely to those of "sufficient importance". This is an extremely undefined wording, which does not really limit States, and this vagueness may give place to disruptive internal rules being seriously detrimental to the principle of the presumption of innocence, and may have a paradoxical effect since that in a directive about presumption of innocence the opposite presumption of guilt is admitted.
143
The prospect emerging from the proposal under discussion appears, then, to be dominated by an idea of the penal system unbalanced in favour of the efficiency of the system to the detriment of individual guarantees. Such efficiency centered approach-being regardless of the intangibility of the single guarantees, and aiming, instead, at preserving a system in balance between public interest and individual rights-, allows dangerous discretional assessments, as regards the concrete effectiveness of guarantees. Notwithstanding the clause included in art. 12, which is meant for avoiding a weakening of the internal guarantees being in force in the member States-, the real risk is the a development of the internal systems being more and more derogatory as regards the presumption of innocence. If the proposed rule is enforced, it is illusory to think that the legislator and perhaps even more the jurisprudence avoid its influence and are not tempted to imitate the erosion of the guarantees connected with the presumption of innocence. 
The Presumption of Danger as Model of the Presumption of Guilt?
The above mentioned European directive proposal, in the part where presumption is always considered to be refutable, appears to be conforming with the typical approach to offenses of abstract danger related to the harm principle. 145 If we want to avoid the undermining of the guarantist function of this principle, the offense against legal assets, should be always an element of the typical character of the offense. 146 The consequence is that the unoffesive fact is not typical, or it is 143 Mazza, 2014: p. 5. 144 For an analysis of the EU directive proposal on the presumption of innocence, in which certain amendments aiming at ensuring the conformity with the international rules on human rights, are suggested, see the document approved by the organizations "International Commission of Jurists" (ICJ), "Justice" and "Netherlands Committee of Jurists for Human Rights" dated March 2015, which can be found in <https://njcm.nl/>. 
146
As regards differences and analogies, notwithstanding the heterogeneous ideological positions, between the Anglo-Saxon harm priciple and the harm principle of the continent, see von Hirsch, 2002: p. 2 et seq.; Wohlers, 2002: p. 16 et seq.; Hefendehl, 2002; p. 20; Fiandaca & Francolini (2008) , passim, and specifically the contributions of Cadoppi, 2008: p. 83 in particular, about the question whether such an element can be the subject of presumption and if the latter can be overcome.
The propension towards the offenses of abstract or presumed danger is often determined by the difficulty of assessment of the causal connection between the conduct and the dangerous event, then the legislator releases the prosecution from this burden, through the presumptions of danger. 148 The debate on the abstract character of danger has been developed specially in Germany,  149 Italy   150 and Spain, 151 the discussion is about whether to consider these presumptions relative or absolute, that is opposable or not during the trial. The theses affirming that they can be overcome derives from the above remembered distinction between abstract and presumed danger, 152 and from the idea that the aporias emerging in the distinction between abstract danger and the harm principle, are not overcome if we do not renounce to absolute pesumptions of danger, always admitting opposite evidence. 153 This approach reduces the difficulties of proving danger, which falls upon the prosecution, leaving to the defendant the possibility of providing an exonerating circumstance aiming at proving that the relative presumption, in the concrete case has not been borne out by the facts, since that the conduct has not caused any danger. Some scholars specify that, in order to avoid the risk of the "return" of the probatio diabolica falling upon the prosecution, the absence of danger should not be only discussed, but really proved, since that the only doubt of abstract danger expressed by the legislator is not enough.
154
This thesis causes some perplexity about the observance of the presumption of innocence, which, together with the connected principle of the in dubio pro reo, 155 represents the transposition at the procedural level, of the function of guarantee of the penal law, because is necessary, within an integrated perspective of the penal system, that a suitable procedural model corresponds to the model of substantive law. 156 The difficult application of the inversion of the burden of Cfr. Pedrazzi, 1979: p. 32 et seq. 149 On the issues concerning the offenses of abstract danger, see the German literature in various works expressing different opinions Schmidt (1999); Graul (1991); Brehm (1973) ; Gallas, 1972: p. 171 et seq.; Schröder, 1967: p. 522 et seq. 150 In the Italian doctrine with different perspectives D'Alessandro (2012); Catenacci, 2006 Catenacci, : p. 1415 Manna, 2002: p. 35 et seq.; Parodi Giusino (1990) ; Fiandaca, 1984: p. 441 et seq.; Gallo (1970) ; Gallo, 1969 : and of p. 1 et seq. Fiore & Fiore (2004) , p. 176 et seq.; Fiore, 1996: p. 65 . Within a future prospect of reform, Mantovani, 1982: p. 70 . With reference to the principle of guilt, Schröder, 1969: p. 14 et seq. 154 Cfr. Catenacci, 2010: p. 54 et seq.; Catenacci, 2012: p. 373 et seq. 155 As regards the connections between the presumption of innocence and the beyond any reasonable doubt criterium, see Stella (2001) , p. 141 et seq.; Ronco, 2006: p. 89 et seq. 156 See Stella (2001), p. 222 et seq.; Hassemer, 1992: p. 378 et seq. proof in crimes of presumed danger (reinterpreted in the sense of a necessary harm principle), derives from this, from a relative presumption which can be overcome. The solution offered gives space to perplexity when the defendant does not want or not manage to fully prove the lack of danger, a proof which could be really "diabolic". If danger is an element, even implicit, of the type of offense, and if to the guarantist model of substantive law a procedural model and a model of fact assessment, being guarantist as well must correspond, the burden of proving the existence of this element should fall upon the prosecution; so, in case of doubt, the decision should be in favour of the defendant.
By a different reasoning (in terms of absolute but also relative presumption), we find an offense in re ipsa, in which the danger presumption prevails over the presumption of innocence and, then, of guilt, thus really weakening the range of constitutional and supranational principles imposing a penal, substantive and procedural system, focused on the guarantee of the defendant.
The Presumption of Fraud and Guilt, Other Examples of the Weakening of the Presumption of Innocence
Similar issues emerge from those hypotheses, which can be approximately defined as presumption of fraud or guilt, in which the legislator or the interpreter, designs a punishment regardless of the assessment of the elements meeting such criteria of subjective indictment.
157 If the dolus in re ipsa is admitted, the will of a tangible fact, without the effective assessment of an intention of doing harm, would be enough. 158 In these cases the structure of human conduct seems to be inextricably linked to a certain meaning, so that when the external behaviour is intentional, the action would impicitly contain that specific psychological datum. 159 To accept such implicit forms of fraud, then, besides being in conflict with the principle of guilt, seems to be also in conflict with that of the presumption of innocence, since that the prosecution would be released from the burden of proving one of the fundamental elements of the type of offense.
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Similar considerations can be made as regards the so called presumed guilt, in which punishability is regardless of the assessment of the predictability or inevitability of the event, elements which on the contrary should always characterize the guilt itself. 161 Penal liability, in these cases, is linked to the assessment of the 157 About the critical points concerning the subjective element and its proof in the Anglo-Saxon systems, Twining (1994) , p. 12 et seq.; Lacey, 1993: p. 621 et seq.; Williams (1965) , p. 9 et seq. More in general about the crisis of proofs in the Anglo-Saxn systems and for a comparison with the continental systems, see Damaška (1997), passim. 158 As regards the perplexities and censure of the presumptions concerning the psychological element of the criminal offense, particularly fraud, in the German literature Perron, 1998: pp. 153 et seq.; Volk, 1993: pp. 618, 624; Hassemer, 1992: pp. 382-383; Hruschka, 1985: pp. 197-198; Schünemann, 1984: pp. 51 et seq.; Henkel, 1961: p. 578 On the inadmissibility of this kind of fraud, in the Italian literature see Bricola (1960) , passim. More recently Pierdonati (2012), passim; Masucci (2004), p. 28 et seq.; Catenacci, 2006 Catenacci, : p. 1421 Marafioti, 2002: pp. 653 et seq.; Pagliaro, 2000 Pagliaro, : p. 2495 As regards the issues concerning the assessment of fraud by the internal penal Court, Mezzetti, 2006: p. 340 et seq.; Pisani, 2001 Pisani, : p. 1372 mere tangible conduct, thus giving place to a kind of hidden objective liability.
By accepting a guilt normative notion, it seems to be inappropriate to talk about presumption, as if the guilt were something existing in nature, acting as a parametre of reality or of fictitiousness of the related assessment. Since it is on the contrary, a normative criterion, the legislator himself cannot presume it, because he builds it, and, if anything, in some cases he does it in a way different from the general notion, a way which can also consist, this time, really, of the presumption of those elements that form the guilt itself, that is its predictability and inevitability. Presumption, then, is referred more exactly, to the elements of predictability and inevitability, not to guilt as such. But the fact remains that, by presuming predictability and inevitability-which are necessary elements of guilt, without which it does not occur-, also guilt is indirectly presumed. 162 An example of presumed guilt may be the aberratio delicti, 163 if we accept the thesis according to which, once the intention of committing a certain offense has been proved, punishability as for guilt of an event different from the intended one, would be regardless of the positive assessment of the predictability and inevitability of such event really occurred. By this reasoning a kind of guilt presumption would emerge, where the author is punished as if he had acted culpably, even if the assessment of guilt lacks. 164 Another hypothesis of presumed guilt may be that of unintentional liability (according to artt. 43 and 584 of the Italian penal code), if we accept the interpretation according to which the event of death must be referred to a specific (or presumed) guilt, consisting of the violation of the same penal law on blows and injuries, that is of the violation of artt. 581 and 582 of the Penal Code. 165 The supporters of this thesis get to the conclusion according to which the assessment of the mere causal connection between conduct and more serious events would be enough, since the guilt atomatically derives from the infringement of the basic penal rule. The necessity of guilt, is then, begging the question, because, ultimately, if unintention would be reduced only to a presumed guilt, we would end up again into a hidden form of objective liability.
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In such examples-and probably in all the other hypotheses of divergence between act intended and act carried out, in which the different event is charged as guilt-by accepting the above said thesis, we can say that the element of predictability is presumed, with all the implications as regards the violation of the presumption of innocence. The above exposed hypotheses make us reflect upon the legitimacy of normative and interpretative models, aiming at considering some elements of the type of offense, being implicit in the tangible fact or to be assessed by presumptions, with a possible reversal of the burden of proof. 169 The legitimation of such paradigms seems to be in conflict-regardless of the contrast with other principleswith the presumption of innocence. A non-fictitious application of such principle, in fact, imposes a burden of proof falling upon the prosecution which must cover all the "essential" elements of the offense, as it is also remembered by the famous and above mentioned sentence of the Supreme Court of the United
States In re Winship.
The point is what we mean for "essential elements", that is, are they freely determined by the legislator, or does essentiality impose limits to his discretional power?
The second alternative appears to be necessary, since it clearly highlights the effects of the presumption of innocence on the substantive penal law, according to an integrated perspective of the penal system which imposes a procedural model conforming with the guarantist model of substantive law. If the offense is that historical fact corresponding to a legal type of offence and is assessed according to the rules of the fair trial, it is evident that these rules would inevitably help to practically determine what the typical fact really is.
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The proof that the prosecution should provide, then, should cover the whole penal disvalue of the fact, represented, in the legal systems of liberaldemocratic and lay inspiration, by the tangibility and harm principle of the conduct and by the guilt of the author. Rules or interpretations that allow a conviction without the assessment of the elements proving the above described penal disvalue, or that admit their fictitious assessment by some forms of presumption, seem to be in conflict also with the principle of the presumption of innocence.
When there are difficulties in the collection of proofs, the legislator tends to "relieve" the type of offence of elements that are essential and the penalty results to be the product of a proof which does not cover all that, according to the principles of a liberademocratic system, serve for showing a real penal disvalue, with effects which that allow to design, again from a probative point of view, the Apart from this, we must observe that the principle of the presumption of innocence cannot be conceived as a weak principle, it cannot be confined to the narrow space of the rules being merely formal-procedural, but it is far-reaching, thus becoming a necessary element of the integrated model of penal system of any social rule of law inspired by the typical liberaldemocratic guarantees. As regards again the field of the harm principle and the principle of guilt, these guarantees would not have any concrete meaning if they are not accompanied by the presumption of innocence in its right sense, and, viceversa, the latter would not have any sense as well, if it is separated by the harm principle and the principle of guilt.
The "guilt", being the subject of assessment with the burden of proof falling upon the prosecution, then, cannot be intended in a reductive way as any form of assessment according to whatever pre-set legal pattern. If so, the guarantist function of the principle would be exhausted, since that its role would be limited to the mere formal and unconditioned reference to any assumption of typical character chosen by the legislator.
The "guilt" (that is colpevolezza, culpabilité, Schuld, culpabilidad to use the
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As regards the proof of fraud, see Hruschka, 1985: p. 197 et seq.; Ragués Vallès (1999) , p. 285. More in general, Saraceno (1940), p. 75. 172 Caterini (2013), p. 146 et seq. expressions used by the ECHR), that is not presumed but to be proved, seems instead, to refer to that idea of global penal disvalue of the conduct-both in an objective and in a subjective sense-as it is described by the guarantist axioms of any social rule of law of social-democratic inspiration. The presumption of innocence, otherwise, could be easily circumvented by the preparation of normative models that for example incriminate unoffesive or unreproachable facts.
Such considerations, in some way, can be also deduced by the above mentioned jurisprudence of the ECtHR that seems to consider that the presumption of innocence can offset some efficiency needs, within reasonable limits. Waivers of the principle would be ultimately admitted, provided that they are reasonable.
It has been already said above, that the supranational judges tend more to a concrete protection and not to declarations of principle, by checking if in the contingent case a breach of the principle has taken place and if this is reasonable in terms of proportion. It seems to be, by borrowing the term used in the American juridical culture, an ad hoc balancing, that is a balancing case by case and not a definitional balancing, that is by "category" or "definitional", which gives place to a general rule likely to be also applied to future conflicting cases. The first kind of balancing, instead, gives place to a settlement of the conflict according to the interests and the circumstances occurred in the concrete case, regardless of the rule wording valid also for other cases. The perplexities caused by the balancing technique are well known, because it is not an interpretation operation, that is aiming at "giving a meaning to the legislator's speech", but its goal is to "reach a satisfying solution because of the presence of a conflict between interests: a solution that […] has nothing to do with the world of meanings […] but rather belongs to the world of decisions and their rhetorical justifications". 174 This can imply a too big "creative" power given to the judge who, in the balancing activity-since the subject of it are heterogenous values that cannot be easily measured-can extend his discretional power too much, with the consequent potential undermining of the content of the fundamental rights recognized by international Constitutions and Conventions, like that of the presumption of innocence. 175 The balancing method as it is also remembered by the CtHR, is guided by reasonability, then by not abstract, general and pre-set rules, but by an intuitive skill which sometimes can assume the character of moral or political judgement. 176 It is, ultimately a choice of an assessment kind, of a value judgement in which an order of preferences is established that is not mentioned in the positive rules. Balancing, then, does not mean "weighing", but rather establishing a "mobile axiological hierarchy", by sacrificing a principle in favour of another or of a conflicting interest. In order to limit the too discretional profiles of the balancing judgements, therefore, some "coordination rules" between principles or conflicting rights should be at least deduced, which offer solutions that can be reproduced in the future, specially in the most important cases, with the effect of making the balancing result less uncertain.
178 They should be rules that as such are liable of subsumption, the application of which should be logically controllable, thus making the balancing process less dependent on the wisdom of the judge and more dependent on the procedure to follow. Judges should refer to controllable argumentation patterns, which do not end up to generally referring to values, they should on the contrary explicit the reasoning followed by themselves in order to let a principle prevail over the other.
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By applying such criteria to the balancing process which involves the principle of the presumption of innocence (and indirectly those of harm and of guilt), first of all it emerges that no "rule of coordination" exists, for example, in the sentences of the ECtHR. The Judge in Strasbourg, as above remembered, only generically underlines that presumptions in fact or in law, provided by the penal law, must fall within reasonable limits, which take into account the importance of "what is at stake" ("enjeu") and the necessity of respecting the defence rights.
The member States, in other words, are required to make a "balance" ("équili-bre") between these two different stages, in order that the means used are proportional to the legitimate pursued aim ("but légitime").
forms of sacrifice of the presumption of innocence, are many. They lend themselves to efficiency exploitations of the penal system, in its integrated, substantive and procedural perspective, giving the legislator and the judge a too big discretional power. Within a political-criminal perspective of a social modern rule of law, there is the necessity not of normative models depriving the types of offense of their essential elements, or that allow probative shortcuts in favour of the prosecution; viceversa there is the real necessity of something else, that is of the consolidation of that penal system oriented to the defence of the fundamental rights, towards a new consideration of the relationships between law and politics. 182 Also within the process of European integration, this should be so, with the conviction that only a criminal policy fully inspired by liberal-democratic principles can guarantee the best kind of security. To reason in a different way,
we risk the recrudescence of those repressive ideologies that have historically privileged a misunderstood social defence against the presumption of innocence, where the European integration should find its first foundation and orientation in the shared illuministic tradition. 183 Such a penal "functionalism" oriented at making the repression answer more efficient, while inhibiting individual guarantees, axiologically tends towards an unliberal regression of a pre-modern kind.
The expectations of modernity themselves, however, are still waiting, most of them, for being fulfilled, and the European harmonization is an opportunity that cannot be willingly wasted.
